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REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE LOWER COURT RULING AND ITS RELIANCE ON PEN-
DER V. JACKSON IS CONTRARY TO UTAH LAW AND 
SHOULD BE REVERSED. 
The Allred Trusts argue that a landlord may not adversely possess property 
through a tenant. In making that argument, the Trusts attempt to contradict decades of 
settled law. See, e.g., 3 Am. Jur. 2d Adverse Possession § 24 ("[T]he possession by a 
tenant of the claimant is in law the possession of the claimant," citing numerous cases). 
The purpose of the requirement of possession is to ensure that the owner of record title is 
on notice that a claimant is asserting ownership. UTAH REAL PROPERTY LAW 
§2.08(a)(5)(iii)atp.89. 
Pender v. Jackson, 123 Utah 501, 260 P.2d 542 (1953), upon which the Trusts and 
the lower court's decision rely, is easily placed in that context. In Pender, the claimant 
did not have physical possession, in person or otherwise. Rather, the claimant merely as-
serted a subjective intention to develop the property in the future. 260 P.2d at 543. There 
was nothing about the claimant's subjective intention that would have placed the owner 
on notice of the claim, and thus the claim was invalid. 
Pender does not supersede Bozeivich v. Slechta, 109 Utah 373, 166 P.2d 239 
(1946), or Adams v. Lamicq, 118 Utah 209, 221 P.2d 1037 (1950). All of the cases cited, 
including Pender, are consistent with the requirement that the nature of the adverse pos-
session be such that the record owner have an opportunity to know that a claim is being 
made. Here, the Trusts had that opportunity, because David and Inez continued to re-
ceive rents on the property and to pay the mortgages and real property taxes on the prop-
erty for nearly two decades. During that time, they renegotiated the lease on several oc-
casions, and they received rents of $395,000 in excess of the mortgage payments. It is 
absurd to contend that the Trusts were not aware of those facts, especially where the trus-
tee prepared the tax returns reporting the income to David and Inez. 
II. THE UNDISPUTED EVIDENCE SUPPORTS SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF DAVID AND INEZ ALLRED ON 
THEIR ADVERSE POSSESSION CLAIM. 
Arguing from the false premise that the Trusts, and not David and Inez, were the 
landlords under the Qwest leases, the Trusts assert that David and Inez were not in pos-
session of the property and thus cannot establish adverse possession. The undisputed 
evidence, however, established that David and Inez executed lease amendments with 
Qwest in 1987, 1994, and 1999, R. 1992-93, 1995-98, and that each of the leases identi-
fied David and Inez Allred as the "Owner." R. 4397, 4468-4508. David and Inez also 
received all rents, paid all expenses including mortgages, and exclusively managed the 
property. Those facts conclusively established David and Inez' status as the "landlords" 
under the Qwest leases, and thus as the possessors of the property. Armed with that evi-
dence, and faced with the Trusts' inability to contradict it, the lower court should have 
granted summary judgment in favor of David and Inez on the adverse possession claim. 
The Trusts assert that David and Inez could not satisfy the elements of adverse 
possession because the quitclaim deeds made the Trusts the landlord to Qwest's tenancy 
by operation of law. The Trusts conclude that they formed a landlord/tenant relationship 
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with Qwest when David and Inez signed the quitclaim deeds in 1982/83, even though the 
Trusts never collected rents or dealt with the tenant in any capacity, and even though 
David and Inez executed new leases with Qwest after the conveyances in question. The 
execution of the quitclaim deeds, without more, was not enough for the Trusts to form a 
landlord/tenant relationship with Qwest and to defeat the adverse possession claim. 
A. Adverse Possession Disregards Record Title and Any Con-
tractual Rights Concerning the Real Property at Issue. 
The Trusts assert that David and Inez's adverse possession claim is defeated by 
their signatures on the trust documents and quitclaim deeds. The Trusts, however, mis-
understand the very nature of adverse possession. 
Adverse possession is a statutory remedy in which a claimant obtains record title 
to real property by demonstrating the elements of adverse possession. UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 78-12-7. It is not necessary that the claimant show that the title of the record title 
holder is invalid and it is understood that every adverse possession claimant must con-
cede that the claimant holds no title and that record title is held in the name of another 
party. See, e.g., Grayson Roper Ltd. Partnership v. Finlinson, 782 P.2d 467, 470 (Utah 
1989) (claimant did not dispute that he did not hold record title). 
Adverse possession is effective despite prior deeds and other documents executed 
by the claimant See Mawson v. Gray, 78 Utah 542, 6 P.2d 157, 159-160 (1931). In 
Mawson, two brothers, Oliver and Robert, together cultivated ten acres of land owned by 
Oliver. Approximately nine years before Robert's death, Oliver deeded five acres of the 
land to Robert. At Robert's death, however, Oliver, "under claim of ownership, contin-
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ued in possession of the property until he conveyed it to [his son], and until then exclu-
sively possessed it as his own." 6 P.2d at 159. In finding that Oliver had established title 
by adverse possession to the five acres that Oliver had previously deeded to Robert, the 
court found that "Oliver occupied and possessed the property, not as an heir of Robert, 
but under claim that he was the owner of it, notwithstanding the prior deed from Oliver to 
Robert." Id. 
Here, as in Mawson, David and Inez occupied and possessed the Provo Property 
through their tenant as the owners of the property, notwithstanding the prior quitclaim 
deeds and trust documents. Thus, David and Inez's adverse possession claim is not af-
fected by the quitclaim deeds, the terms of the Trusts, or any recognition that record title 
is not held in their names. See Sheppick v. Sheppick, 44 Utah 131, 138 P. 1169, 1171 
(1914) (presumption of possession in favor of record title holder overcome when the ad-
verse claimant repudiates the title of the record title holder). 
B. Qwest and the Trusts Never Entered Into a Landlord/Tenant 
Relationship. 
"Attornment is the act of a person who holds a leasehold interest, or estate for life 
or years, by which he agrees to become the tenant of a stranger who has acquired the fee 
in the land, or the remainder or reversion, or the right to the rent or services by which the 
tenant holds. It is an act by which a tenant acknowledges his obligation to a new land-
lord." Consolidated Realty Group v. Sizzling Platter, Inc., 930 P.2d 268, 269-70 n.2 
(Utah 1996) (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 130 (6th ed. 1990)). 
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Qwest and the Trusts stipulated in the Third Amendment to Lease signed by them 
in June 2000 that "notice of [the quitclaim deeds] was not provided to [Qwest] prior to 
this Third Amendment and Tenant has continued to enter into leases with the original 
owners, David H. Alhed and Inez H. Allred." R. 1896-97. There is no question that 
Qwest did not "acknowledge [its] obligation to a new landlord;" rather, Qwest admittedly 
"continued to enter into leases with the original owners," David and Inez. Hence, the 
Trusts never formed a landlord/tenant relationship with Qwest and David and Inez's land-
lord/tenant relationship with Qwest remained unchallenged. Morever, Qwest remained 
David and Inez's tenant until June 2000. 
C. To the Extent the Trusts Formed a Landlord/Tenant Relation-
ship With Qwest by Reason of the Quitclaim Deeds, David 
and Inez Immediately Ousted the Trusts from Any Such Rela-
tionship. 
Even if the Court accepts the Trusts' assertion that the quitclaim deeds were suffi-
cient to create a landlord/tenant relationship between Qwest and the Trusts, David and 
Inez ousted the Trusts from this relationship immediately after the quitclaim deeds were 
signed. 
"To ripen into title, it is necessary that an adverse claimant's possession operate as 
an ouster of the possession of the true owner." Adams v. Lamicq, 221 P.2d at 1040. A 
landlord/tenant relationship arises where the landlord accepts rent payment from a tenant. 
See Woodland Theatres, Inc. v. ABC Intermountain Theatres, Inc., 560 P.2d 700, 701 
(Utah 1977). Indeed, "no more affirmative act of ownership can be asserted than the col-
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lection of the rents thereon." Land Clearance for Redevelopment Authority of the City of 
St. Louis v. Zitko, 386 S.W.2d 69, 83 (Mo. 1964) (en banc). 
Not only did the Trusts fail to establish a landlord/tenant relationship with Qwest 
after the quitclaim deeds were signed, David and Inez ousted the Trusts from any such re-
lationship by 1) collecting and using without limitation all rents that Qwest paid, 
2) entering into multiple subsequent leases with Qwest, 3) paying all income taxes on the 
rental income, and 4) exclusively conducting all communications and correspondence 
with Qwest. 
In contrast, it is undisputed that the Trusts never had any communication with 
Qwest, R. 1896-97, the Trusts never received any rents from the Property until August 
2000, R. 4393-97, 1896-97, the Trusts ratified David and Inez's claim of rental income 
and payment of income taxes from the rents, R. 1896-97, and the Trusts never entered 
into a lease with Qwest until June 2000, R. 1896-97. 
The Trusts also assert that the lower court could have relied on Bates 0771 to find 
an issue of material fact precluding summary judgment. Bates 0771, however, does not 
raise any issues of material fact because it does not reference the Trusts, there is no testi-
mony to interpret it or give it meaning, and it does not challenge the undisputed fact that 
David and Inez controlled all aspects of the Provo Property and the position of landlord 
to Qwest's tenancy. Indeed, Bates 0771 supports the fact that David and Inez controlled 
the collection and disbursements of rents, the execution of all leases and communications 
with Qwest, and the reporting of all income from the Provo Property for a number of 
years following recording of the quitclaim deeds. 
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Based on the undisputed facts, if the Trusts ever had a landlord/tenant relationship 
with Qwest, David and Inez quickly ousted the Trusts and formed their own land-
lord/tenant relationship with Qwest beginning in 1983. There is no issue of fact preclud-
ing summary judgment in favor of David and Inez and judgment should be entered in 
their favor. 
D. There Is No Evidence That David and Inez Held the Provo 
Property by Permission from the Trusts and the Lower 
Court's Exclusion of the Only Testimony Concerning Permis-
sion Has Not Been Appealed. 
The Trusts assert that David and Inez's adverse possession claim fails because 
David and Inez's possession was by express permission from the Trusts. The Trusts fail 
to support this allegation with any citation to the record because the lower court pre-
cluded such testimony. The Trusts attempted to present testimony to the lower court of 
an alleged "secret agreement" between the Trusts and David Allred in which Richard G. 
Allred alleged that David Allred expressly performed all actions of the landlord with 
Qwest as the agent of the Trusts. R. 4333-90. The lower court excluded any evidence of 
any such "secret agreement." R. 6123-27. The Trusts have not appealed the lower 
court's exclusion of this testimony and there is no evidence that David and Inez's conduct 
regarding the Property and Qwest was by express permission. Hence, the undisputed 
evidence remains that David and Inez's possession, occupation, and conduct establishing 
adverse possession was in their own right and not by permission. 
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III. REVERSAL OF THE LOWER COURT'S ORDER OF SUM-
MARY JUDGMENT BASED ON THE STATUTE OF LIMITA-
TIONS AS TO DAVID AND INEZ'S BREACH OF FIDUCIARY 
DUTY, FRAUD, CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST, DECLARATORY 
JUDGMENT, AND PUNITIVE DAMAGE CLAIMS IS WAR-
RANTED. 
The Trusts maintain that the lower court's entry of judgment on David and Inez's 
breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, constructive trust, declaratory judgment, and punitive 
damage claims is proper for the following reasons: First, the Trusts assert that David and 
Inez failed to raise equitable estoppel and equitable tolling (also known as the "special 
circumstances exception") before the lower court. Next, the Trusts assert that tolling of 
the statute of limitations is improper under either equitable tolling or equitable estoppel 
because David and Inez were aware of the facts underlying their claims well before they 
filed their complaint. Finally, the Trusts assert that summary judgment was appropriate 
based on an alleged lack of merit in David and Inez's breach of fiduciary duty and fraud 
claims and based on alleged inconsistencies in Inez's testimony before the lower court. 
As set forth below, each of those assertions lacks merit. 
A. David and Inez Properly Raised Equitable Estoppel and Eq-
uitable Tolling as a Defense to the Trusts' Motion for Sum-
mary Judgment Based on the Statute of Limitations. 
David and Inez raised equitable estoppel and equitable tolling as defenses to the 
Trusts' motion for summary judgment based on the statute of limitations, at R. 5550-51. 
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B. David and Inez Presented Evidence Supporting Application of 
Both Equitable Tolling and Equitable Estoppel Which Pre-
cludes Summary Judgment on These Defenses. 
The Trusts assert that David and Inez cannot establish equitable estoppel or equi-
table tolling because "David Allred was fully cognizant of the circumstances, had advice 
and counsel from his attorney, threatened legal action, and allowed the statute to run hav-
ing full knowledge of the quitclaim deeds, the Trusts, and their effect." Appellee's Brief 
at 30. 
The equitable tolling or the special circumstances exception tolls the statute of 
limitations "in exceptional circumstances where the application of the general rule would 
be 'irrational' or 'unjust.'" Sevy v. Security Title Co., 902 P.2d 629, 636 (Utah 1995) (ci-
tation omitted). To establish equitable estoppel, "'it is enough if the party has been in-
duced to refrain from using such means or taking such action as lay in his power, by 
which he might have retrieved his position and saved himself from loss.'" Rice v. Gran-
ite Sch. Dist, 23 Utah 2d 22, 456 P.2d 159, 162 (1969) (citation omitted). Whether es-
toppel bars a defendant's statute of limitations defense depends on the facts and circum-
stances giving rise to the claimed estoppel. Id. at 163. Hence, "determining . . . whether 
a plaintiff acted reasonably under the circumstances [is a] fact-intensive inquir[y] that 
'precludefs judgment as a matter of law] in all but the clearest of cases.'" In re 
Malualani B. Hoopiiaina Trust v. Hoopiiaina, 2006 UT 53, f 37, 144 P.3d 1129 (quoting 
Russell Packard Dev.} Inc. v. Carson, 2005 UT 14, f39, 108 P.3d 741 (alteration in 
original) (quoting Berenda v. Langford, 914 P.2d 45, 54 (Utah 1996)). 
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Here, the lower court, although it never addressed equitable estoppel or the special 
circumstances objection, relied on several letters by David and Inez in order to reach the 
conclusion that the statute of limitations barred all of David and Inez's claims other than 
adverse possession. The letters, however, were only a small portion of the evidence pre-
sented to the lower court on the issue whether the statute of limitations was tolled. The 
lower court failed to recognize the evidence showing the following circumstances during 
the relevant time: 
1. Preparation of tax returns. Richard G. Allred prepared David and 
Inez's tax returns for many years. For 1994, 1995, 1996, and 1997 (signed in 1998), he 
asserted in those returns that David and Inez were entitled to the income from the Provo 
Property. David and Inez relied on the Trusts' concession that David and Inez were the 
rightful owners of the rental income in not pursuing legal action sooner. 
2. Trusts' misleading conduct. The trustees of the Trusts, Richard G. 
Allred and Mary Lee Allred, ratified and acknowledged that Qwest had never dealt with 
the Trusts and had no knowledge of the Trusts prior to entering into the Third Amend-
ment to Lease. R. 1896-97. Also, prior to August 2000, the Trusts never asserted any 
claim to ownership of the rents produced by the Provo Property. 
3. Richard G. Allred's conduct. In representations to David and Inez, 
Richard G. Allred led and induced his parents to believe that a resolution would be ac-
complished without legal action. Richard now denies any such representation. David 
and Inez reasonably relied on Richard's representation to their detriment and the Trusts 
should now be estopped from repudiating this representation. 
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4. Richard G. Alfred's relationship. Throughout the period preceding 
the 1982/83 quitclaim deeds through June 2000, Richard G. Allred was diligent in main-
taining a confidential and fiduciary relationship with his parents. In particular, following 
David and Inez's demand for return of title to the Provo Property after 1991, Richard 
continued his relationship with his parents by preparing their tax returns through taxable 
year 1997, continuing to visit them regularly and perform maintenance of their home and 
cars, and continuing to provide them with legal advice on taxes and other topics. Despite 
this continued relationship, the Trusts now assert that David and Inez should have sued 
the Trusts and their son earlier. 
The foregoing evidence precluded the court from granting summary judgment on 
the statute of limitations defense. The Trusts cannot take steps and make representations 
that reasonably induced David and Inez's forbearance, and then reverse those steps and 
representations once the limitations period has run. 
C. The Merits of David and Inez's Claims Are Not at Issue on 
Appeal and Should Be Resolved by a Jury. 
The Trusts apparently assert that David and Inez's claims of fraud and breach of 
fiduciary duty lack merit and Inez's testimony is unreliable. The merits of David and 
Inez's fraud and breach of fiduciary duty claims were never addressed by the lower court. 
The parties briefed the facts and law concerning fraud and breach of fiduciary duty, but 
the lower court determined that those claims were barred by the statute of limitations and 
never made any findings of fact or conclusions of law concerning those claims. They are 
appropriately left to the trier of fact on remand. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, appellants request that this Court reverse the decision of 
the lower court and remand the case for entry of judgment in favor of the appellants on 
their adverse possession claim; and for trial of appellants' breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, 
constructive trust, declaratory judgment, and punitive damages claims. 
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BRIEF OF CROSS-APPELLEES ON "CROSS-APPEAL OF OVERRULING 
OF FINAL JUDGMENT IN A CIVIL CASE" 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The Trusts' cross-appeal challenges the lower court's rejection of the Trusts' 
claim for an accounting of all rent paid to David and Inez under the leases. The lower 
court found, following an evidentiary hearing, that the claim was barred by waiver, es-
toppel, and failure to establish grounds justifying an accounting. The following issues 
are presented: 
1. Did the lower court abuse its discretion in reopening the issues of waiver, 
estoppel, and entitlement to an accounting after Judge Stott issued his Memorandum De-
cision, but before final judgment was entered? "The question of whether to grant a mo-
tion for a new trial is within the discretion of the trial court, whose ruling will not be dis-
turbed on appeal unless the facts show a clear abuse of discretion." Chournos v. 
D'Agnillo, 642 P.2d 710, 713 (Utah 1982). Moreover, "[bjecause trial courts are under 
no obligation to consider motions for reconsideration, any decision to address or not to 
address the merits of such a motion is highly discretionary." Tschaggeny v. Milbank Ins. 
Co., 2007 UT 37, f 15 (citation omitted). A trial court's grant of a motion to reconsider 
is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard and "may be overturned only 'if there 
is no reasonable basis for the decision." Id. (quoting Langeland v. Monarch Motors, 952 
P.2d 1058,1061 (Utah 1998)). 
2. Does substantial evidence support the lower court's decision that the Trusts 
waived any right to the rents? "Whether a party has effectuated a waiver is a mixed ques-
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tion of law and fact." United Park City Mines Co. v. Stichting Mayflower Mountain 
Fonds, 2006 UT 35, f 21, 140 P.3d 1200 (citations omitted). "'Whether the trial court 
employed the proper standard of waiver presents a legal question which is reviewed for 
correctness, but the actions or events allegedly supporting waiver are factual in nature 
and should be reviewed as factual determinations.'" Id. (quoting Pledger v. Gillespie, 
1999 UT 54,116, 982 P.2d 572). Accordingly, this Court "'grant[s] broadened discre-
tion to the trial court's findings' when reviewing questions of waiver." Id. (quoting Chen 
v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, f 23, 100 P.3d 1177). "A trial court's findings of fact will not be 
set aside unless clearly erroneous." Chen, 2004 at \ 19 (citing State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 
932, 935-36 (Utah 1994)). 
SUMMARY O F ARGUMENT 
The foundation of the Trusts' cross appeal is the incorrect argument that an inter-
locutory decision of the trial court is not subject to revision prior to the entry of final 
judgment. Numerous cases contradict the Trusts' position. Interlocutory rulings of the 
district court are subject to revision at any time prior to entry of judgment, and a decision 
to reconsider a previous ruling lies within the sound discretion of the trial court. No 
abuse of that discretion has been shown in this case. Judge Schof ield correctly decided 
that Judge Stott had erred in refusing to consider evidence of waiver and estoppel, and al-
lowed the issue to be reopened because, "I think Judge Stott has placed this case in a 
place of circumstance where there's a significant likelihood of reversal, and I would just 
as soon fix it." 
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Even though the motion that resulted in hvoii'.idernliiin <\.r A\UA i imlnin Inr 
new "rial under Rule 59, the 2004 decision of Judge Stott was clearly not a final order. 
11-. • . •. • • . ,is case was not entered until 2005. The Trusts' timeliness arguments 
are without me ' nine iiiiiii iimlcr Rule V) had nm \ nminenced at the time the mo-
tion was filed. 
The Trusts also argue that the decision violated the "law of the case" doctrine. 
^ h • . - ion or retirement, the new judge on the case 
stands in the shou& oi die pievious md-v * K- ^ )i isidei : d one ji idicial • Dfficer for 
purposes of application of the law of the ease doctrine. For that reason, Judge 
Si'holichTs da isimi in laonsidci the decision of Judge Stott did not implicate !he ].r.\ -' 
the case doctrine. 
^-•i :)ir niciiis. (he trial - njirt made detailed findings of fact supporting its ;ipplii .11 
: ., „di,,i iiid estoppel defenses. Those findings are entitled to deference on ap-
peal. Ihr Tnish, ni i liiillenyiiig tluisi IIIKIHIPS, .iii: icquired to marshal, the evidence, 
which they have failed to do. In fact, 'they do not even chalU-nge th* . M ^ S -
even though it was an independent basis for the court's decision. The trial court's deci-
ii III " ir. i i i i i p h • i t i ) l i 1 Yidrikriii.ii I \kiiani A11 red knew that his parents claimed 
ownership, yet prepared and signed tax returns for them,,, slimyIIM.' llial lliv> wn." I'nlillrd 
to the rents and obligated to pay the income tax on those rents. He also allowed his par-
• - engages and other expenses, and to exercise control over 
the excess funds. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED NO PROCEDURAL ER-
ROR IN RECONSIDERING THE WAIVER DEFENSE. 
While this case was pending in the district court, it was assigned to two different 
judges. R. 7194-98 and 8033-48. The case was first assigned to Judge Schofield in 2001, 
it was rotated to Judge Stott in 2003, and it rotated back to Judge Schofield in 2005. 
R. 1207-08, 5904-10, 8081-85. In particular, the Trusts object to Judge Schofield's re-
consideration of Judge Stott's September 22, 2004 oral ruling. 
Judge Stott held an evidentiary hearing on September 22, 2004 on the Trusts' ac-
counting counterclaim. R. 8168. At the conclusion of the hearing, Judge Stott ruled 
orally that Trusts were entitled to a judgment against David and Inez in the amount of 
$127,800. R. 8168:108-9. Judge Stott found that David and Inez had stipulated to owing 
the Trusts $395,814.95, reduced to $127,800 based on application of the statute of limita-
tions, and precluded David and Inez from presenting evidence of or maintaining waiver 
and estoppel affirmative defenses. R. 8168:19-31. No such stipulation was made, how-
ever. David and Inez simply acknowledged that the difference between the rents col-
lected and amounts paid on the mortgages from 1983 to 2000 was $395,814.95. 
Later on the day of the hearing, the Trusts filed a written motion for prejudgment 
interest. R. 6935-40. Approximately two weeks after the hearing, the Trusts filed a mo-
tion for reconsideration of Judge Stott's ruling concerning the statute of limitations. 
R. 6998-7018. Briefing on the motions was concluded by early November and thereafter 
in November counsel sent a proposed order concerning the September 22, 2004 hearing 
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to the Trusts. R. 7175. In response lo llir proposed on In, iln i nhK tlniiiiiulul h\ luln 
dated December 3, 2004 that he order strictly follow Judge Stott's oral statements ;- K 
•-.. ,;s .. v. >tott heard argument on the motions on December 17. 2004 Ac 
nying reconsiderat M-;^ I:,C prejudgment intereM. ^-
sue under advisement. R. 7190, 8180. 
\, me in t of the year Judge Schofield rotated in to replace Judge Stott. Before 
" ^ • • •' • . , (1u ; i L A - Miis Memorandum Decision re-
0ai^iig die Iru^u iiiotioii iui | ir* l \ •- . -• 1 t KM l'S HI 111 r Meinnr/imimii 
Decision, Judge Stott specificallv referred to his ruling and findings from the September 
11,1\)\ 14 hearing. \{, /1 *).I *>K In particular, the Memorandum Decision addressed Judge 
Stott'& erroneous • dh * or the judgment. 
- -j,,
 a r x 2s, 2005, Da\id and Inez moved the lower conn 
*".. No tinal order was ever issued in connection with the September 22, 2004 
hearing. 
The parties fully briefed the motion for new 1ri.1l .nnl Iimnm' w;\s in 111 In in n 
- Schofield who took the motion under advisement. R. 7370-7411, 7418-22, 7426-
> ^ - • . • MIIu->. !u: additional argument on the motion for new 
trial and granted a new trial to permit David and Inez to preseii1 e\ idem v of Iln "i v .!", " 
and estoppel affirmative defense- R 7521-22 Judge Schofield stated the reasons for 
Ihc HI'IMI to re -„a^> ; . a' '^epicuiio 2.. 11/04 ruling as follows: 
I'm going to allow Ms. /\nrea vum ha counsel to put un eviuence on . le 
issue of setoffs because I think Judge Stott's simply in error on that anu i 
don't want to perpetuate that error send it up to the court of append .• A 
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have them in my view a likely reversal on that point. I simply think that by 
not allowing that issue to be resolved, I think Judge Stott has placed this 
case in a place of circumstance where there's a significant likelihood of re-
versal, and I would just as soon fix it. 
My view is that Judge Stott simply didn't let you get in any of those af-
firmative defenses. I think you're entitled to have a hearing on them. We 
have talked largely about setoff because that's the one that's certainly . . . 
well we have talked about them but I'm going to allow you to put on evi-
dence on any of those affirmative defenses that were not raised in front of 
Judge Stott in September of last year. Statute of limitations law, we're not 
going back there. 
R. 8176:40,42. 
A. The Timeliness of David and Inez's Motion for New Trial Is 
Irrelevant Because the Lower Court Could Appropriately 
Modify Its Previous Orders. 
The foregoing facts demonstrate that David and Inez's motion for new trial was 
timely filed. UTAH R. CiV. P. 59(b) provides that a motion for new trial shall be filed 
"not later than 10 days after the entry of the judgment." In this case, no final judgment 
was rendered which could have triggered the 10-day time limit prior to the filing of the 
motion. A motion for new trial filed before a final judgment is considered timely filed. 
See, e.g., Regan v. Blount, 1999 UT App 153, f 6, 978 P.2d 1051. 
More to the point, "[t]rial courts have clear discretion to reconsider and change 
their position with respect to any orders or decisions as long as no final judgment has 
been rendered." Brookside Mobile Home Park, Ltd v. Peebles, 2002 UT 48, 118, 48 
P.3d968 
We have interpreted Rule 54(b) to allow "a [trial] court to change its 
position with respect to any order or decision before a final judgment has 
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been render*-d in the case. nminiy v. Mrs. tieia* u ^ / o , iwi i .id 
1306, 1310 n.2 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); accord Timm v. Dewsnup. 851 T\2d 
i i 'X 1 184-85 (Utah 1993) (permitting reconsideration of summary judg-
ment under Rule 54(b) and holding summary judgment did P.H fully dis-
r"-e of case when part of counterclaim remained in iiai co;*;i. w, 
thus subject to revision); Kennedy [v. Afew Ern /'.v/m. ,//ZC], 600 l\2d i ^ Uj 
at 536-37 [Utah 1979]; Salt Lake City Corp. . ' imes Constructors, Inc., 
761 P.2d 42, 44 n.5 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (stating "Rule 54(b) allows courts 
to readjust prior rulings in . . . cases . . . unless those rulings disposed of en-
tire claims or parties and those rulings were specifically certified as final"). 
' motion to revise was properly before the trial court pursuant 
to Kuie D4(D). Because a final judgment had not yet been rendered dispos-
ing of all of the parties chums (i.e., Reagan's counterclaim was out-
standing), the court had the power to revise its summary judgment order 
i Ral 51(b). Sei\ <'.#.. Ih>n Houston, VI ')., In< v. Intermountain 
Health Care, Inc., 933 IV.d M)\ 406 (Utah ( ; App 1W7» -providing 
judgment is not a final, appealable order if it does not dispose of all the 
claims in -> -^ .~ : - hiding counterclaims"). 
T
~ P > '.. Inc. • • General, Inc., 1999 UT App 303, m 5v5*. {)9() P W >: 
liere, each ui the rulings the Trusts assert were erroneouslv modified b} die lower 
coi ii I: w ei e • inte i im i i: ilii igs ai id v ; ei e not final Because no final judgment was at issue 
with regard to David and Inez's motion for i)i'\\ dial Rule i'l vv is IK»I unplu ah ill mil ill 
lower court appropriately modified the rulings under Rule 54(b). 
In the present case, pec... .e Judge Lewis never signed an order granting de-
fendants' motion for summary judgment nor entered judgment thereon, 
plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration was, in essence, not a motion for re-
consideration at all, but simply a reargument of their opposition to defen-
dants' motion for summary judgment, which a trial court is free to enters.... 
at any point prior to entry of a final order or judgment. See, e.g., Bennion w 
Hansen. 6W P.2d 757. 760 (Utah 1985). Accordingly, ii A as not improper 
for the trial oM>,*t w \ l - plaintiffs' motion or for ;hi * court to consider 
it on apnea I. 
Ron Shepherd Ins. T Shields, 882 P.2d 650, 653 n.4 (1994); accord, Timm v. 
De 14 >snup, - i - < - (I Jtah 1993) (permitting reconsideration of summary 
! < ) • 
judgment under Rule 54(b) and holding summary judgment did not fully dispose of case 
when part of counterclaim remained in trial court, and was thus subject to revision); Salt 
Lake City Corp. v. James Constructors, Inc., 761 P.2d 42, 44 n.5 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) 
("Rule 54(b) allows courts to readjust prior rulings in . . . cases . . . unless those rulings 
disposed of entire claims or parties and those rulings were specifically certified as fi-
nal").1 
B. The Law of the Case Doctrine Does Not Preclude One Judge 
from Reconsidering the Ruling of Another Where the Change 
in Judge Assignment Is Caused By Rotation. 
The Trusts assert that Judge Schofield's modification of rulings made by Judge 
Stott violated the "law of the case" doctrine. In this case, however, Judge Schofield and 
Judge Stott were judges in the same case and are considered to be a single judicial offi-
cer. "Law of the case applies only to final determinations and 'does not prevent a judge 
from reconsidering his or her previous nonfinal order.'" State v. O'Neil, 848 P.2d 694, 
697 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 859 P.2d 585 (1993) (quoting Plumb v. State, 809 P.2d 
734, 739-40 (Utah 1990)). 
The Utah Court of Appeals has specifically held that rotation of judge assignments 
in the Fourth District does not implicate the law of the case doctrine because the judges 
Because the lower court was free to amend its own order under Rule 54(b), it is irrele-
vant whether David and Inez failed to timely draft a written order. The lower court's de-
cision to address the merits of David and Inez's motion was "highly discretionary" and 
the Allred Trusts have not presented any law or evidence that the court abused its discre-
tion in any way. See Tschaggeny, 2007 UT at 15-16. In any event, the procedural record 
establishes that the Allred Trusts contributed to any delay in producing a written order. 
Also, the Allred Trusts had an opportunity to bring any alleged delay to the attention of 
the lower court at a hearing held December 17, 2004 and did not. 
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occupy the same judicial position 11,1, 111,.' « \\\v luieihike lh\\vilntu>\\ hu , i < Wi Will 
Towne, 954 P.?d 1205, 1208 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (Judge Schofield ivpl:u:cd Jinlge 
I -. Liiitni; as long as Judge Burningham "would have had the authority to grant a new 
trial, jiid-v Si-'o'vid jhu hud !lu" Jiulhonly" I '|l|iulial and subsequent judges of the 
same court are on the same footing as concerns the effeel m'•» prn»r npi<T mi laki1 |udkial 
action; In re Adoption of EM., 2004 UT App 419, \ 22, 103 P.3d 17 7. 
^
T
-
i
 - : ..!• - . .UJ:J .^Hoitcki arc iniuai and subsequent judges of the 
same court who, for the purr<v^s r*" ?h. r i .K-. nc -.a.ue jddi^ui 
officer. M.; ,^e flto Trembly v. Mrs, Fields Cookies, 884 P.2d 1306, 151 • 
App. I lW4) (" ' 11 |n a sense, the two judges, while different persons, constitute a single ju-
dicial office IV) I I • I S\ III [1111 L'.IM" piirj^ OM'S I 11114 > i 111J^  trll/mnrv \\ngilt, .V U ! d 4°1 
439-40 (Utah 1993) (Orme, I , concurring)). '"When Judge s ,. 
! nl'i't Stott on this case, Judge Schofield had the same authority to reuew ail interim oi-
dors ii'i (In origin.il )UIIJ!C \\liu iv»nul iliL iihlti, See Macris v. Sculptured Software, Inc., 
2001 ? I" --3, (|[3u, 24 l\3d 984; Gillmor, K50 I1 \1 ;it 1 i11 <" " \nh;x Mmplis . I«I'"> ,,, i 
deviated from his own prior interim decision . . . he could have deviated from [the prior 
... ip* -L - .... I . concurnn* ^ 
^.vi ^ u r k l PRui'Lki.i DiiThkMlNlil) l'HAI1 
WAIVER BARRFIVJUE TRUSTS' ACCOUNTING CLAIM. 
i -jii • .age Siou ^ initial refusal to consider the waiver and estoppel de-
fenses, Judv2e Schofield held * •••• i\ heiinii-' •!• A Lin li lliose ueienses were pre-
sented. His order concerning the accounting counterclaim is details' • >** 
21-
things, sets forth the following support for the determination that the Trusts waived any 
right to rents from 1983, when they received record title, to August 2000 when they first 
received any rents: 
4. Following conveyance of the Provo Property to the Trusts, 
plaintiffs continued to receive all rents from the Provo Property and to pay 
all expenses of the property and expenses were reimbursed to plaintiffs by 
the tenant. Plaintiffs made all mortgage payments due on the property. 
10. By 1992, Richard G. Allred, who has the sole trustee of eight 
of the trusts and the beneficiary of the ninth trust from 1982 until present, 
was well aware that his parents made a claim to the property even though it 
was titled in the name of the trusts. 
11. By 1992 and 1993, Richard G. Allred was well aware that his 
parents were claiming ownership to the property and that the quitclaim 
deeds had been submitted in error or by some kind of fraud or deceit. 
15. The Allred Trusts knew or should have known from at least 
by 1994 that plaintiffs claimed the rents as their own property because 
defendant Richard G. Allred prepared and signed plaintiffs' tax returns as a 
"paid preparer" in 1994, 1996, and 1997, and as "preparer" in 1995. The 
tax returns prepared by Richard G. Allred for the years 1994, 1995, 1996, 
and 1997 reported that the rents and expenses related to the Provo Property 
belonged to plaintiffs. 
16. Plaintiffs received all rents from the property until August 
2000. 
24. Richard G. Allred knew that the Allred Trusts were the own-
ers of the Provo Property and as the owners would be entitled to the bene-
fits of ownership, including rents. This was a matter of considerable dis-
cussion between him and his parents and some very unhappy and angry let-
ters from his parents. 
25. Despite having knowledge that the Allred Trusts had rights, 
or at least could make a claim of ownership to the rents, Richard G. Allred 
prepared and signed, as preparer, ("paid preparer" in 1994, 1996, and 1997, 
and as "preparer" in 1995) his parents' tax returns in 1994, 1995, 1996, and 
1997 in which his parents claimed the rents from the Provo Property as 
their own personal income. 
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26. Those itdioiu i mi ililuti' a .11 HI H chnquishment i 4 
known rkr 
i he waiver continued into the year 2001 and subsequently 
t .• K , i . i ' • <M\-sait was filed. 
R. 8033-48 (Order on Accounting Counterclaim "it., J •> \ 
Those factual findings are entitled to deference on appeal. United Park City Mines Co. v. 
Sdihii/n: >].... • ;... „;„<.s. .-*... o . ii i ! 140P.3dl200. 
r^. / r i fusis railed d l '; /. .-v - . / . < , • . / .,--
Lower Court's Ruling. 
I he I rusts assert that the evidence was insufficient to support the trial court's de-
cision that the 1 iiihh wiihi'd llii, ii in i minimi* \ Liu T'lie 1 iu^». however, have failed to 
marshal the evidence in favor of 'the lower court's judgmen • : • • 
to consider this issue on appeal. 
WTuii « h.dlcnging I!KI >nllicn.,iK \ n-'i lilic evidence, an appellant "must marshal all 
of the evidence in support" of the trial coirf - ''*.'.•• 
dence, including all reasonable inferences, is insufficient to support the findings. State v. 
Ini'u //. 2000 I" I \ | r 10'^  1,| I I ()(HI i»,AJ 12M In order to satisfy the marshaling re™ 
quirement, parties must 
"\ •; iporarih remove [their] own prejudices and fully embrace the adver-
sary's position"- !i!-i-\ j nnM play the "devil's advocate," In so doing, ap-
pellants must present the evidence in ;* h;:ht most favorable to the trial court 
and not attempt to construe the evidence in a light favorable to their case 
Iti sum, to properly marshal the evidence the challenging party must 
demonstrate how the court found the facts from the evidence and then ex-
plain why those finding contradict the clear weight of the evidence. 
( %>n i Stnum, J KM 111 X.!, 1( /!\ IIH) VJd 1177 (quoting Harding v. Bell :0CP \ i 
108/1 19, 57P.3dl()OlK 
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A party who fails to marshal the evidence faces "grim consequences." United 
Park City Mines Co. v. Stichting Mayflower Mountain Fonds, 2006 UT 35, f 27, 140 
P.3d 1200. Where an appellant fails to marshal the evidence, the Court need not consider 
that challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence in support of the findings. See Tanner v. 
Carter, 2001 UT 18, f 17, 20 P.3d 332. Rather, the Court assumes that the record sup-
ports the findings of the lower court. See State v. Larsen, 828 P.2d 487, 490 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1992). 
The Trusts have entirely failed to marshal the evidence in favor of the lower 
court's ruling that the Trusts' accounting claim was barred by waiver. "What [the Trusts 
have] done instead is 'merely re-argue the factual case . . . presented in the trial court,' 
leaving [David and Inez] and this court to bear the expense and time of performing the 
critical task of marshaling the evidence. This is unfair, inefficient, and unacceptable." 
United Park City Mines, 2006 UT 35, f 26, quoting Chen, 2004 UT 82, f 77. This Court 
should, therefore, sustain the lower court's order regarding waiver without consideration 
of the Trusts' challenge on appeal. 
B. The Lower Court's Ruling on the Trusts' Accounting Coun-
terclaim Is Warranted For Reasons the Trusts Have Not Ap-
pealed. 
The Trusts appear to challenge only the lower court's determination that the ac-
counting counterclaim was barred due to waiver. The lower court, however, determined 
that the accounting claim was barred based on waiver, estoppel, and failure to present any 
"basis on which to base a claim for an accounting either in equity or at law." R. 8037-39. 
Because the Trusts do not challenge the alternate bases on which the lower court barred 
-24-
the accounting counterclaim, the Trust / i hiillengi1' of < 'liw'i hmilil nr rcjei Ini M IIIIIHM 
any further analysis. See, e.g., State v, Montiel, 2004 UT App '242, f20, 95 P.Sd 1216 
( V""t lien challenging a trial court's decision, we have made it clear that an appellant must 
address all ^t tin eh. innsdiiu es ii|un i„\ In li (In1 , .mil -. decision was based, )„ State v. 
Baker, 963 P.2d 801, 810 (Utah Ct. App. I9VS) ^iefiM.ig u> oi> / 
court's sentencing decision because defendant challenged only two of four findings upon 
which i li*/ M.Miteiu mg decision ^ ts hascdl. 
v.. The Lower Court's DeterwitKHi'',, /,*; ./u /)^.^/^ UWhy -
i?/g/?i to /tente Is Well-Support r! w the Record. 
""i .ciiiK)iiai lUmquishment of a known rigH T - onstitute 
waiver, there must be ; ^  \^;»:w IUIN i v . • . u . ^^ '•*-
tence, and an intention to relinquish it." Soter's, Inc. v. Deseret Federal Savim< / * 
. \x\ .'. ^ f' i ' f. (Utah 1993) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
I In* findhms ml Ilk Mini i niiii with li Jit1 \il |uidally set forth above at pages 22 
through 23, well document and support the lower court's judgnv :-. ,ls W.IIVMI 
any r>ht ^ art accounting. The Trusts allowed David md Ine> o continue to receive all 
;
 -\--*-.:;-- , nL.igL.s. Kiciiai'u - - \ wl. as trustee, knew that 
his parents claimed ownership. He prepared and signed r-'vn • 
rents belonged to his parents, and with all of that knowledge and more allowed his par-
In the face of the above findings (In1 husls hil,l\uiiil<) i^cit lli.il assignment « I 
rents to the Trusts contained in the trust documents David and Inez signed in 1982 could 
not be waived by the trustees. The Trusts fail to cite any authority to support that posi-
tion and the proposition is contrary to Utah law. Cf., CCD, L.C. v. Millsap, 2005 UT 42, 
^[34, 116 P.3d 366 (party waived first claim by entering into an amended agreement but 
did not waive subsequent claim). 
The Trusts also assert that any waiver commenced by the trustees' acts ended 
when the trustees stopped preparing the tax returns in tax year 1997 (signed in 1998). By 
that time, however, the Trusts had already waived their rights, if any, to rents and after 
1997 never asserted any right to the rents until August 2000. Hence, the Trusts' waiver 
continued until August 2000 when the Trusts challenged David and Inez's receipt of the 
rents. 
Based on the foregoing evidence, the trial court's factual finding of waiver is sup-
ported by substantial evidence in the record and should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm the trial court's rejection of the 
Trusts' claim for accounting and reimbursement of rents. 
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BRTFF OF
 ( : M O S S . A P P E L L E E S O N "CROSS-APPEAL OF SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT IN CONSOLIDATED CIVIL CASE" 
r
 i PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Did!" •* • , - • • .\, t,« •< rending," which was .re-
corded against the title of proper* v which was not • l ., * 
title*- --.\ Jiic name of any potential j--^r>ent tlebu»r in the case, was a slander oi title'/ 
i1n/" lower coiiil enlnnl summary judgment against the Alfred Trusts on this issue. M> ;hc 
appeal of that decision ^v-.-' -* • ;e,mess. A inters v. 
Schulman, 1999 UT App 119, <J[ 9, 977 P.2d 1218, cert, denied, 994 P.2d 1271 ( P w> I 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Alfred Trusts nnnr.-v • • iiiiisolitkital uise involving appellees 
A
*~ "
 A
 T-^ci* Trustee for the David 11. Alfred Exemption Trust and M~ 
-. i.<*. .cieued to herein as "Jensen"). R. 388. Jensen brought a .omplann 
uvair^ tTi \ ; ; ' N . :ig real property located in Bountiful, 
Li ah held by Jensen (the "Bountiful property"). R. 6. 
Jensen has held title to the Bountiful property since 1992, R, 4-5. On January 16, 
1992, I )ii\ ml 11 All i il .iiiil M.iiiii 11 , 'illit'tl i vecuted a quitclaim deed conveying title to 
the Bountiful property to the David H. and Mary ' * * ! 
at lhe Davis County Recorder's office on June 8, 2001, entry no. 1666725, book 2824, 
"1 
" Unless otherwise designated, all citation to the record in 'this Brief of Cross-Appellees 
on "Cross-Appeal of Summary Judgment in Consolidated Case" refers to the record for 
Case No. 05042290 and not the record concerning Case No. 010400765 with which this 
matter was consolidated for -nrnose^ . T .moeal. 
page 93. On January 17, 2003, Mary A. Jensen, trustee for the David H. and Mary H. 
Allred Trust, transferred an undivided 1/2 interest in the Bountiful Property to Mary A. 
Jensen, Trustee of the David H. Allred Exemption Trust; and an undivided 1/2 interest in 
the Bountiful Property to Mary A. Jensen, Trustee of the Mary H. Allred Survivor's 
Trust. None of the referenced trusts were parties to the underlying action in Utah 
County. 
On December 30, 2004 the Allred Trusts filed with the Davis County Recorder a 
"Notice of Action Pending." encumbering the title to the Bountiful property. R. 145-46; 
Cross-Appellant's Addendum M. The Notice of Action Pending contains a pleading cap-
tion in the case between David and Inez Allred and the Allred Trusts that is the subject of 
the consolidated appeal as Case No. 010400765. R. 145-46. The Notice of Action Pend-
ing purports to give notice that the Bountiful property is subject to a judgment held by the 
Allred Trusts against David and Inez and warning that "any transfer, conveyance, or en-
cumbrance may be considered by the Court to be a violation of a Universal Utah Fraudu-
lent Conveyance Act, and any parties considering any of the above-mentioned actions are 
hereby put on notice." R. 145. 
In January 2005, Jensen demanded that the Allred Trusts remove the Notice of Ac-
tion Pending on the basis that it was an invalid lis pendens that clouded the title to the 
Bountiful property. R. 140-41. The Allred Trusts refused. Jensen thereafter filed a 
complaint in Davis County, Utah for removal of the Notice of Action Pending and for 
slander of title. R. 1-6. The Davis County Court transferred the lis pendens action to 
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Utah County to be heard by the sanx- incite presiding i n er lln .u lion In. (ween David and 
Inez M\d (he Allred Trusts. R. 242. 
.-. '/cpteiiiDor. .•• • Jensen moved the Court for release of the Notice *»f Action 
Pend •.-.: . d • i I'liu/ut, I*!. III. In granting summary judgment and or-
dering the release of the Notice of Action Pend i n LV • • = : 
a ^ U J ! Defendant's "Notice of Action Pending" recorded -v ;;n 
the Davis County Recorder is a lis pendens within the meaning of \ \.\h 
( V d c A i ^ ^ 7H--!(V^ , r u n 78-40-2 ^; 
\Iten Defendants filed their Notice 01 Action Pending 
on December 30. 20(K m judgment existed t r winch Defendants could 
reasonably rely in filing the Notice of Action Pending: 
. . ;«. i •  tnnji uic A*,.ice 
ol Action Pending 
d tun the fact that a lis pendens had been recorded against the 
Provo property in Utah County was irrelevant to whether Defendants were 
entitled to file a lis pendens against the Bountiful property; 
e. -:ai I he records are clear that at the time Defendant:- *.• 
corded the Notice of Action Pending, the record owners of the Bountiful 
property were not parties to the action pending before this Court in l/iah 
County; and 
f. That according to the Utah lis pendens statute, utu .ney's fees 
and costs are warranted in this matter because Defendants did not have sub-
stantial justification for recording the Notice ot Acti< n. Fending and no 
other circumstances rxist that would make the imposition of attorney's fees 
and costs unjust 
R. 348-49 (Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Release of Lis Pendens and for Sum-
m.'ii • 'Ci;;. . ..^ciiLLi to this Brief as Addendum B) As a ^csulL the lower Court di-
rected that in. \' • * nit I" iiinliii;" be I i u i s u ..,:•. , .in award or attorney's 
fees and costs in favor of Mary A. Jensen, R. 349. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The lower court correctly held that the "Notice of Action Pending" was an im-
proper lis pendens. No provision of the Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes proceedings 
to collect upon a judgment before the judgment has been entered. The Allred Trusts' 
claim that UTAH R. CiV. P. 7(f)(1) authorizes encumbering property prior to entry of final 
judgment was not raised in the court below and in any event is contrary to the entire 
structure of the Rules. The Rules plainly contemplate that only written, final judgments 
may serve as the basis for actions to collect a judgment. 
More importantly, the Bountiful property was not owned by the putative judgment 
debtors and had not been owned by them since 1992. No action to establish a fraudulent 
conveyance was ever filed. The Allred Trusts thus had no justification for attempting to 
cloud the title to that property, and the lower court correctly held that Notice to be an im-
proper lis pendens and correctly required the Allred Trusts to pay Jensen's attorney's fees 
in removing the cloud from the title. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE ALLRED TRUSTS' ASSERTION THAT THEIR "NOTICE 
OF ACTION PENDING" WAS RECORDED PURSUANT TO 
RULE 7(f)(1), UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, IN FUR-
THERANCE OF A COLLECTION OF A DEBT IS RAISED FOR 
THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL. 
The Allred Trusts assert that the Notice of Action Pending does not violate UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 78-40-2 (the "Lis Pendens Statute"), because it was filed pursuant to UTAH 
R. Civ. P. 7(f)(1), in furtherance of the collection of a debt. The Allred Trusts also ap-
pear to assert that the notice was properly filed pursuant to a judgment. The Allred 
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Trusts, however, never raised these issues before the lower court and are barred from 
raising them for the first time on appeal. In re Schwenke, 2004 UT 17, f 34, 89 P.3d 117 
("It is well-established that we generally will not address issues raised for the first time 
on appeal.") (citation omitted); Romrell v. Zions First Nat'l Bank, N.A., 611 P.2d 392, 
395 (Utah 1980) ("As a general rule, an issue raised initially in a reply brief will not be 
considered on appeal.. . .") . 
II. THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT THE ALL-
RED TRUSTS' "NOTICE OF ACTION PENDING" VIOLATED 
THE LIS PENDENS STATUTE. 
The Allred Trusts arguments to justify their filing of the "Notice of Action Pend-
ing" are frivolous. The Allred Trusts did not have a judgment, had no interest in the 
Bountiful property, and took no steps to establish that the property, which David and Inez 
had not owned in their own names since 1992, should be available under the Fraudulent 
Conveyance Act to satisfy an alleged "judgment" entered against David and Inez in 2004. 
Judge Stott's September 22, 2004 decision was not a judgment. A "judgment" is 
"a decree and any order from which an appeal lies." UTAH R. Civ. P. 54(a). The rule 
plainly contemplates a written document, not an oral statement of the Court. 
The provisions of UTAH R. Civ. P. 7(f)(1) governing orders also plainly contem-
plate written orders: 
An order includes every direction of the court, including a minute 
order entered in writing, not included in a judgment. An order for the pay-
ment of money may be enforced in the same manner as if it were a judg-
ment. . . . 
- ^ 1 -
If this rule permitted writs of execution to be issued based upon oral statements of the 
court which have not even been reduced to written form, let alone signed by the court or 
final for purposes of appeal, then a party subject to an adverse order which is not final 
and cannot be appealed would nevertheless be subject to execution and collection pro-
ceedings. That is in effect what the Allred Trusts attempted to do here. Such a procedure 
would circumvent UTAH R. ClV. P. 62(a), which provides that no execution may issue on 
a judgment until 10 days after its entry, and UTAH R. ClV. P. 64E(a), which provides, "A 
writ of execution is available . . . following entry of a final judgment 
In order to properly pursue a judgment against real property, the judgment holder 
is required to file a copy of the judgment or abstract of judgment with the county re-
corder. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-22-l(7)(a). The Allred Trusts did not file a copy of a 
judgment or an abstract of a judgment because none existed. Their inability to comply 
with the statute belies their claim that an enforceable judgment existed. 
More importantly, the attempt to encumber the Bountiful property was improper 
because the putative judgment debtors had conveyed the property to Jensen as trustee 12 
years earlier. The Allred Trusts attempt to bridge that gaping legal chasm with the naked 
conclusion that the 1992 transfer violated the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, UTAH 
CODE ANN. §§ 25-6-1 et seq. Setting aside the facial absurdity of such a claim in connec-
tion with an action filed in 2001, nine years after the transfer, no finding of violation of 
the Act had been made or even requested at the time the Notice of Action Pending was 
filed, or at any time thereafter. The property of third parties is not available to satisfy a 
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judgment simply because the judgment creditor believes it should be, and it was improper 
for the Allred Trusts to attempt to encumber that property. 
The trial court correctly deemed the Notice of Action Pending to be an unlawful 
lis pendens which violated UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-40-1 et seq. Under that statute, the 
court must order a notice released if "the court finds that the claimant has not established 
by a preponderance of the evidence the probable validity of the real property claim that is 
the subject of the notice." Id. § 78-40-2.5(3). The court in the present case correctly 
made such a finding. 
The statute also provides that "[a] court shall award costs and attorney fees to a 
prevailing party on any motion under this section unless the court finds that: (a) the non-
prevailing party acted with substantial justification; or (b) other circumstances make the 
imposition of attorney fees and costs unjust." UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-40-2.5(7). 
The lower court found that attorney's fees were warranted because "when the [All-
red Trusts] filed their Notice of Action Pending on December 30, 2004, no judgment ex-
isted on which [the Allred Trusts] could reasonably rely in filing the Notice of Action 
Pending." R. 350. The court also found that the Allred Trusts had "no reasonable basis 
for filing the Notice of Action Pending," R. 350, and that the "records are clear that at the 
time [the Allred Trusts] recorded the Notice of Action Pending, the record owners of the 
Bountiful Property were not parties to the action pending before" the lower court in Utah 
County. R. 349. Those findings were in accordance with law and supported by substan-
tial evidence. 
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Pursuant to the Lis Pendens Statute, Jensen is entitled to attorney's fees and costs 
related to the Allred Trusts cross-appeal concerning the lis pendens matter. Jensen, there-
fore, requests this Court's order remanding the issue of attorney's fees on appeal to the 
lower court for determination of the amount of attorney's fees. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm the lower court's judgment in 
the consolidated case. 
DATED this 2?%ay of June, 2007. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
C \DOCUMENTS AND SETTINGS\RRP\DESKTOP\REPLY BRIEFDOC 6/27/07 
Michael R. Carlston 
Kenneth L. Reich 
Attorneys for Appellants and 
Cross-Appellees 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the foregoing REPLY BRIEF 
OF APPELLANTS/BRIEF OF CROSS-APPELLEES were served by U.S. Mail on June 
27, 2007 as follows: 
RICHARD G ALLRED 
1660 W BROADWAY APT 302 
ANAHEIM CA 92802-1147 
MARY LEE ALLRED 
1527 VINEYARD DR 
BOUNTIFUL UT 84010-1333 
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ADDENDUM 
A. Order on Accounting Counterclaim, October 13, 2005 
B. Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Release of Lis Pendens 
and for Summary Judgment, January 12, 2006 
ADDENDUM A 
CORY D. MEMMOTT, #8346 
PLANT, CHRISTENSEN & KANELL 
136 East South Temple, Suite 1700 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-7611 
Fax: (801) 531-9747 
Attorneys for counter claim defense 
of Inez H. Allred 
Michael R. Carlston, #0577 
Kenneth L. Reich, #8578 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, 11 t h Floor 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145 
Attorneys for the Plaintiffs 
FILED 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
of Utah County, State of Utah 
lii-i-^QS: Deputy 
v _ > 4 * 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF UTAH, STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID H. ALLRED, e ta / 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
RICHARD G. ALLRED, eta/ , 
Defendants. 
ORDER ON ACCOUNTING 
COUNTERCLAIM 
Civil No. 010400765 
DIVISION #8 
This case came on regularly for hearing and trial concerning 
defendants' accounting counterclaim before the Court on September 22, 
2005 and July 20, 2005. Plaintiff Inez H. Allred and Mary Allred Jensen, as 
personal representative of the Estate of David H. Allred, ("Plaintiffs") were 
represented by their counsel, Michael R. Carlston of Snow, Christensen & 
Martineau. Cory D. Memmott of Plant, Christensen & Kanell appeared on the 
counterclaim defense of Inez H. Allred. Richard G. Allred, as trustee for the 
Richard Mark Allred Trust, the Robert Matthew Allred Trust, the Mary 
Michelle Allred Trust, the Michael Christopher Allred Trust, the Stephen 
James Allred Trust, the Karen Allred Trust, the Nathan Allred Trust, the Mary 
Allred Trust, and Mary Lee Allred, trustee for the Richard G. Allred Trust 
appeared on behalf of the nine "Allred Trusts." 
Having reviewed the briefs and oral arguments of the parties, 
testimony of witnesses, and exhibits presented, the Court now makes the 
following findings of fact: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiffs entered into a lease of real property located in Provo, 
Utah County, State of Utah (the "Provo Property"), with Mountain States 
Telephone and Telegraph in 1973 as tenant, and which the tenant has 
continued to lease to the present. 
2. Amendments to the lease have been made as follows: 
a. The original lease on the Provo Property was modified for 
the principal purpose of building additional space on the 
premises for lease to the tenant by way of a Lease 
Addendum dated November 1, 1980 between David H. and 
Inez H. Allred as owner and Mountain States Telephone & 
Telegraph Company as Tenant. 
b. In 1994, the "First Amendment to Lease Agreement" dated 
February 28, 1994, was signed by U.S. West 
Communications, Inc. as "Tenant" and Plaintiffs as "Owner" 
which extended the term of the Lease to February 28, 
1999. 
c. In 1999, the "Second Amendment to Lease Agreement" 
dated June 1, 1999 was signed by U.S. West 
Communications, Inc. as "Tenant" and Plaintiffs as "Owner" 
which extended the terms of the Lease to February 29, 
2004. 
d. In 2000, the "Third Amendment to Lease Agreement" 
dated June 19, 2000, was signed by Qwest 
Communications, Inc. as "Tenant" and the defendant 
Trusts as "Owner" which clarified ownership in favor of the 
Allred Trusts, among other things. 
3. Plaintiffs conveyed the Provo Property to the Allred Trusts in 
December 1982 and February 1983. 
4. Following conveyance of the Provo Property to the Allred Trusts, 
plaintiffs continued to receive all rents from the Provo Property and to pay 
all expenses of the property and expenses were reimbursed to plaintiffs by 
the tenant. Plaintiffs made all mortgage payments due on the property. 
5. In 1992, a dispute had arisen in the family concerning the 
validity of the quitclaim deeds and whether in fact the Plaintiffs intended the 
deeds to have been executed and recorded. That dispute resulted in several 
meetings between Richard G. Allred and his parents. Other meetings 
between the Plaintiffs and their children (including Richard G. Allred) were 
also held. This dispute also culminated in a number of letters written by 
David and Inez Allred to Richard G. Allred. 
6. From at least 1992 forward, plaintiffs demanded return of title 
from Defendants on a continual basis. 
7. In a letter with a date of January 25th, 1992, David Allred, 
states that " I have asked you several times, Richard, to furnish me with a 
copy of the so-called trust agreement covering the Provo property. After it 
was executed I never did receive a copy, and I am at a loss to know what is 
contained in such . . . Please comply with my request immediately. I am 
tired of being put off and ignored with my requests." 
8. In the January 25, 1993 letter from David and Inez Allred to 
Richard Allred, Exhibit No. 107, the Plaintiffs make it clear that they have 
been bamboozled by their son in regards to the Provo Property. In addition, 
the Plaintiffs make it clear that they expected and demanded that their son, 
Richard G. Allred, return the Provo Property to them by executing a 
quitclaim deed. The Plaintiffs also state that Richard G. Allred's claim that 
he didn't dare convey the properties back because then he would be liable to 
the beneficiaries was pure hogwash. 
9. In the February 13, 1993 letter, David H. Allred states that if 
Richard G. Allred does not sign the quit claim deed returning their Provo 
Property to them that he will essentially take his son to church court to deal 
with this and other issues. 
10. By 1992, Richard G. Allred, who has the sole trustee of eight of 
the trusts and the beneficiary of the ninth trust from 1982 until present, was 
well aware that his parents made a claim to the property even though it was 
titled in the name of the trusts. 
11. By 1992 and 1993, Richard G. Allred was well aware that his 
parents were claiming ownership to the property and that the quitclaim 
deeds had been submitted in error or by some kind of fraud or deceit. 
12. From 1994 through 1997, Richard G. Allred was the preparer of 
tax returns for David and Inez Allred. In each of those tax returns, David H. 
Allred and Inez Allred claimed as income their personal income the rents 
from the Provo property. 
13. Those tax returns were prepared by Richard G. Allred on behalf 
of his parents as an outside preparer and David and Inez Allred did not 
prepare their own returns. 
14. For the period 1994 through 1997, Richard Allred knew very well 
that the rents from the Provo Property were included as income on the 
Plaintiffs' tax returns because he prepared the tax returns and signed them 
as "paid preparer" or as "preparer." 
15. The Allred Trusts knew or should have known from at least by 
1994 that plaintiffs claimed the rents as their own property because 
defendant Richard G. Allred prepared and signed plaintiffs" tax returns, 
signing as a "paid preparer" in 1994, 1996, and 1997, and as "preparer" in 
1995. The tax returns prepared by Richard G. Allred for the years 1994, 
1995, 1996, and 1997 reported that the rents and expenses related to the 
Provo Property belonged to plaintiffs. 
16. Plaintiffs received all rents from the property until August 2000. 
17. Plaintiffs acknowledged receiving $395,814.95 in rent in excess 
of amounts paid as mortgage on the property between 1983 and August 
2000. Of this amount, $127,800.00 was received during the period from 
March 1998 to July 2000. 
18. Starting in 2001, this court ruled that the Allred trusts should 
receive the financial benefit from the property, which was rents paid at the 
present time by Qwest, but also by its predecessors, the telephone 
company, US West and Mountain Bell before that. 
19. The Allred Trusts in their Counterclaim at 1)28 sought an 
accounting and a return of funds "to the extent said funds exceed the 
amounts paid for the benefit of the Trust beneficiaries . . . ." Plaintiffs 
asserted in its pleading that it had paid money for the benefit of the 
beneficiaries of the Allred Trusts and was entitled to other offsets and claims 
in amounts greater than the amount received net of mortgage payments. 
20. The Allred Trusts have submitted no documents establishing a 
contractual basis or obligation to plaintiffs to proceed with an accounting. 
Likewise, defendants submitted no evidence establishing plaintiffs otherwise 
had agreed or were obliged to provide an accounting. The Allred Trusts 
have not presented any alternative basis on which to base a claim for an 
accounting either in equity or at law such as wrongful conversion of funds or 
any legal duty to account. 
21. In support of her claim for an offset, Inez filed Exhibit No. 821, 
which purports to be a statement of $28,406.29 that she gave to or for the 
benefit of the beneficiaries of the trust, and as to which she thinks that she 
should receive a setoff from $127,800.00, the amount of rents from March 
1998 to March 2001 (the period of time acknowledged by the parties as 
being three (3) years from when the Defendants). 
22. The majority of the proposed setoffs were simply gifts, either 
birthday or Christmas. 
23. The Plaintiffs asserted as one of their affirmative defenses that 
the Allred Trusts waived any claim to those rent proceeds. 
24. Richard G. Allred knew that the Allred Trusts were the owners of 
the Provo property and as the owners would be entitled to the benefits of 
ownership, including rents. This was a matter of considerable discussion 
between him and his parents and some very unhappy and angry letters from 
his parents. 
25. Despite having knowledge that the Allred Trusts had rights, or at 
least could make a claim of ownership to the rents, Richard G. Allred 
prepared and signed, as preparer, ("paid preparer" in 1994, 1996, and 1997, 
and as "preparer" in 1995) his parents' tax returns in 1994, 1995, 1996 and 
1997 in which his parents claimed the rents from the Provo Property as their 
own personal income. 
26. Those actions constitute a waiver or relinquishment of a known 
right. 
27. The waiver continued into the year 2001 and subsequently 
thereafter this lawsuit was filed. 
28. The Allred Trusts are estopped from asserting a claim to the 
rents from the Provo Property. 
29. Richard G. Allred, the trustee of eight of the trusts and a 
beneficiary of the ninth, participated with the Plaintiffs in reporting the rental 
income at issue as the Plaintiffs' personal income. Richard G. Allred knew 
that the Plaintiffs where using the rental income from the Provo Property as 
their own. The Plaintiffs made a change in their position to their 
determinant by using the rental income from the Provo property as their 
own with the knowledge of Richard G. Allred. 
30. The Plaintiffs have failed to properly support their laches and 
ratification affirmative defenses. 
31. Richard G. Allred claims there was no waiver within the three 
years immediately preceding the filing of this lawsuit. However, Richard G. 
Allred started the waiver in 1992 and did not take any action to change the 
waiver or reassert the Allred Trusts' rights until March 2001. In addition, the 
1997 tax return, Exhibit 132, was signed on April 10, 1998. 
32. Richard G. Allred's waiver of the Allred Trusts' rights continued 
from 1992 until the counterclaim was filed in March 2001. 
33. The Allred trusts are not entitled to a judgment: against the 
Plaintiffs. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The statute of limitations on the Allred Trusts' claim for rents is 
the three-year statute of limitations found in Utah Code Ann. §78-12-26. 
2. The statute of limitations is not tolled by the "discovery rule." 
The Court finds that beginning in at least 1992, plaintiffs demanded return of 
title to the Provo Property, and that in the years 1994, 1995, 1996, and 
1997, Richard G. Allred prepared plaintiffs' tax returns in which it was 
reputed that the Provo Property income and expenses was asserted as 
belonging to the plaintiffs. Accordingly, the Court finds and concludes the 
discovery rule inapplicable in this instance and that the Allred Trusts had 
specific and adequate notice of any claim for an accounting it may have had 
as early as 1992 and at the very latest in 1994. 
3. The Allred Trusts submitted no documents establishing a 
contractual basis or obligation to plaintiffs to proceed with an accounting. 
Likewise, there is no evidence establishing plaintiffs otherwise had agreed or 
were obliged to provide an accounting. The Allred Trusts have not presented 
any alternative basis on which to base a claim for an accounting either in 
equity or at law. Plaintiffs, however, acknowledged receiving $395,814.95 in 
rent in excess of amounts paid as mortgage on the property between 1983 
and August 2000. Based upon the statute of limitations, the Court reduces 
this amount to $127,800.00, the amount of rents from the Provo Property 
retained by plaintiffs from March 1998 to March 2001, the three years 
preceding the Allred Trusts' claim for an accounting. 
4. The Plaintiffs have failed to adequately support their claims for 
set-off, laches and ratification. 
5. Richard Allred as the trustee of eight of the trusts and 
beneficiary of the ninth trust, waived the rights which the Allred trusts had 
to the rents from the Provo property. 
6. The Allred Trusts are estopped from asserting an accounting 
claim against David and Inez Allred through the actions of Richard G. Allred, 
trustee of eight of the trusts and beneficiary of the ninth trust. 
7. The Allred Trusts are not entitled to any money judgment 
against David and Inez Allred. 
NOW THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendant Allred 
Trust's accounting counterclaim is barred by waiver and estopppel and that 
the Defendant Allred Trusts' accounting counterclaim is hereby DISMISSED 
WITH PREJUDICE. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the issues regarding the order on the 
Motion for Award of prejudgment interest are obviated by the above ruling. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the issues regarding the order on the 
Motion for reconsideration are obviated by the above ruling. 
At the September 22, 2004 hearing, the following motions were 
presented to the Court: (1) Defendants' Motion in Limine Precluding 
Counter-Defendant From Claiming a Statute of Limitations Defense as to an 
Accounting and Restoration of Trust Funds; (2) Defendants' Motion in Limine 
to Prohibit the Introduction of Any Evidence of Any Payments to the 
Beneficiaries of the Trusts Without Sufficient Documentary Evidence, i.e. 
Receipts, Cancelled Checks, Etc.; (3) Defendants' Motion in Limine to 
Preclude Plaintiffs from Claiming Credit as a Distribution from the Trust 
Proceeds Any Checks that Were Issued to Defendants from Accounts Other 
than the Accounts to Which the Rent Proceeds Were Deposited; (4) 
Defendants' Motion in Limine to Prohibit Plaintiffs' Claim that Any of the 
Payments to Richard Allred and Stephen Allred and Their Families Were 
Trust Distributions; (5) Defendants' Motion in Limine to Preclude Plaintiffs 
from Claiming or Introducing any Evidence of Payments or Credits of Any 
Nature to Richard Allred and/or Stephen Allred Prior to the Inception of the 
Trusts on December 30, 1982; (6) Defendants' Motion in Limine to Preclude 
Introduction of Alleged Property Expenses Taken from Income Tax Returns 
of Plaintiffs; and (7) Defendants' Motion in Limine to Preclude Introduction of 
Plaintiffs' Documents for Which Privilege was Claimed, and No Production 
was Made During the Discovery Process 
In conjunction with the above findings of fact and conclusions of law, 
the Court further reviewed the motions by the parties and based upon the 
briefs submitted, the arguments made, and for good cause appearing, 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED: 
That no motions in limine were granted prior to trial. Each side was 
instructed that any objection it wished to make with respect to evidence 
presented at trial should be made during trial. 
DATED this i Z day of AwgtJst 2005. 
BY THE COURT 
Anthon^'vVJ'Sehofiel^.l 
District € fc t t Judg§^* \$ 
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Salt Lake City, UT 84145 
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I hereby certify that on this ^>\ day of August 2005, I mailed a true 
and correct conformed copy of the foregoing document, via U.S. Mail first 
class, postage prepaid, to the following counsel of record: 
Richard G. Allred 
1660 W. Broadway, Suite 302 
Anaheim, CA 92802 
Mary Lee Allred 
1527 Vineyard Drive 
Bountiful, UT 84010 
Michael R. Carlston 
Kenneth L. Reich 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, 11 t h Floor 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145 
Cory D. Memmott 
PLANT, CHRISTENSEN & KANELL 
136 East South Temple, Suite 1700 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
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MICHAEL R. CARLSTON (A0577) 
KENNETH L. REICH (A8578) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MARY A. JENSEN, Trustee for the 
DAVID H. ALLRED EXEMPTION 
TRUST and the MARY H. ALLRED 
SURVIVOR'S TRUST, 
Plaintiff, 
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS' 
MOTION FOR RELEASE OF LIS 
PENDENS AND FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
vs. 
RICHARD G. ALLRED, Trustee for THE 
RICHARD MARK ALLRED TRUST, 
THE ROBERT MATTHEW ALLRED 
TRUST, THE MARY MICHELLE 
ALLRED TRUST, THE MICHAEL 
CHRISTOPHER ALLRED TRUST, THE 
STEPHEN JAMES ALLRED TRUST, 
THE KAREN ALLRED TRUST, THE 
NATHAN ALLRED TRUST, THE MARY 
ALLRED TRUST; and MARY LEE 
ALLRED, Trustee for THE RICHARD G. 
ALLRED TRUST, 
Case No. 050402290 
Judge Anthony W. Schofield 
Defendants. 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Release of Lis Pendens and for Summary Judgment came on 
regularly for hearing before the Court on November 30, 2005. Defendants Richard G. Allred and 
Mary Lee Allred were present with Richard G. Allred representing Defendants. Plaintiffs were 
represented by their counsel, Michael R. Carlston of Snow, Christensen & Martineau. Counsel 
presented arguments in support of the various Memoranda previously filed, Plaintiffs also 
requested award of attorney's fees on the basis of the Utah lis pendens statute. Having reviewed 
the briefs, exhibits, and affidavits submitted, the Court heard oral argument on each of the issues 
raised in each of the motions, and for good cause appearing, 
THE COURT FINDS: 
a. That Defendants' "Notice of Action Pending" recorded with the Davis 
County Recorder is a lis pendens within the meaning of Utah Code Ann. § 78-40-2 and § 78-40-
2.5; 
b. That when Defendants filed their Notice of Action Pending on December 
30, 2004, no judgment existed on which Defendants could reasonably rely in filing the Notice of 
Action Pending; 
c. That Defendants had no reasonable basis for filing the Notice of Action 
Pending; 
d. That the fact that a lis pendens had been recorded against the Provo 
Property in Utah County was irrelevant to whether Defendants were entitled to file a lis pendens 
against the Bountiful Property; 
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e. That the records are clear that at the time Defendants recorded the Notice 
of Action Pending, the record owners of the Bountiful Property were not parties to the action 
pending before this Court in Utah County; and 
f. That according to the Utah lis pendens statute, attorney's fees and costs are 
warranted in this matter because Defendants did not have substantial justification for recording 
the Notice of Action Pending and no other circumstances exist that would make the imposition of 
attorney's fees and costs unjust. 
THE COURT HEREBY ORDERS: 
a. That Plaintiffs' Motion for Release of Lis Pendens and for Summary 
Judgment is granted; 
b. That Defendants are ordered to timely record with the Davis County 
Recorder a release of the Notice of Action Pending; 
c. That should Defendants fail to timely release the Notice of Action 
Pending, the Clerk of the Court is directed to enter an order releasing the Notice of Action 
Pending; and 
d. That Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs is granted and 
Plaintiffs are ordered to submit an itemization of attorney's fees and costs within ten (10) days of 
the Court executing this Order. 
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IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED this jZ-day of , \ >&*\iV "2C06 05. 
Honorable ^r^j^^.^chi^Beld 
Fourth District £&te***»**"*' 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER 
GRANTING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR RELEASE OF LIS PENDENS AND FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT was mailed, first-class, postage prepaid, on this l*f day of 
December, 2005, to the following counsel of record: 
Richard G. Allred 
1660 West Broadway, Suite 302 
Anaheim, California 92802 
Mary Lee Allred 
1527 Vineyard Drive 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Cory Memmott 
Plant, Christensen & Kanell 
136 East South Temple #1700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
y\^jm^ll 
N:\20874\l\PIeadings\order re bountiful property 2.wpd 
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